Entropic Inequalities for a Class of Quantum Secret Sharing States by Sarvepalli, Pradeep
ar
X
iv
:1
00
9.
04
92
v1
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  2
 Se
p 2
01
0
Entropic Inequalities for a Class of Quantum Secret Sharing States
Pradeep Sarvepalli∗
Department of Physics and Astronomy, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z1
(Dated: September 2, 2010)
It is well-known that von Neumann entropy is nonmonotonic unlike Shannon entropy (which is
monotonically nondecreasing). Consequently, it is difficult to relate the entropies of the subsystems
of a given quantum state. In this paper, we show that if we consider quantum secret sharing states
arising from a class of monotone span programs, then we can partially recover the monotonicity of
entropy for the so-called unauthorized sets. Furthermore, we can show for these quantum states the
entropy of the authorized sets is monotonically nonincreasing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we are motivated by the fact that one
of the reasons why von Neumann entropy behaves dif-
ferently from the Shannon entropy is rooted in its non-
monotonicity. A consequence of this fact is that many
results and techniques of classical information theory do
not smoothly generalize; one has to frequently overcome
the obstacles imposed by the breakdown of monotonic-
ity, often manifesting in various disguises. In classical
secret sharing, one makes extensive use of information
theoretic inequalities to bound the performance of secret
sharing schemes, see [1–6]. In most cases these techniques
do not appear to carry over to quantum secret sharing
schemes, at least not easily. Quantum secret sharing has
grown rapidly since its inception in [7]. Despite the grow-
ing body of literature on quantum secret sharing, see for
instance [7–12] and the references therein, only a few of
them, most notably [13, 14], have succeeded in employing
information theoretic methods for quantum secret shar-
ing.
This paper attempts to contribute along this direc-
tion by studying the von Neumann entropy of subsets
of a given quantum state. Of course, for an arbitrary
quantum state we cannot expect a relation similar to the
Shannon entropy. However, by imposing some restric-
tions on the quantum states, namely by considering a
class of quantum secret sharing states, we are able to
prove something definite.
Our main result is that if we consider a class of secret
sharing quantum states, then we can prove that the von
Neumann entropy is monotonically nondecreasing for cer-
tain subsystems of the quantum state, namely the unau-
thorized sets. The secret sharing states that we consider
in this correspondence are those arising from a realiza-
tion of the quantum secret sharing scheme via monotone
span programs in a “normal form”. We also show that
for the subsystems that are authorized, the entropy is
monotonically nonincreasing.
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II. BACKGROUND
Before presenting our main result, we review briefly
the relevant background. In this paper a quantum se-
cret sharing scheme refers to a protocol to distribute an
unknown quantum state to a group of n players so that
only authorized subsets of players can reconstruct the
secret quantum state [7–9]. The state received by any
participant is called a share. The set of players is de-
noted as P = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The collection of authorized
sets, denoted as Γ, is called the access structure and the
collection of unauthorized sets, denoted A, is called the
adversary structure. The dual access structure is defined
as
Γ∗ = {A ⊆ P | A¯ 6∈ Γ}, (1)
where A¯ = P \A.
An access structure Γ can be realized by a quantum
secret sharing scheme if and only if it satisfies Γ ⊆ Γ∗,
see [9, 10]. An access structure is said to be self-dual
if Γ = Γ∗. A self-dual access structure can be realized
as quantum secret sharing scheme so that pure states
are encoded as pure states; the associated secret sharing
scheme is said to be a pure-state scheme. If Γ ( Γ∗,
then the associated secret sharing scheme encodes some
pure state into a mixed state; such schemes are called
mixed-state schemes.
An authorized set is said to be minimal if every proper
subset of it is unauthorized. Minimal authorized sets
completely characterize an access structure and we de-
note the collection of minimal authorized sets of Γ by
Γmin.
A secret sharing scheme is said to be connected if ev-
ery participant occurs in some minimal authorized set.
A participant who does not occur in any minimal autho-
rized set is said to be unimportant and the share asso-
ciated to that player can be discarded without loss. We
can assume that the access structure is defined on the re-
duced set of players excluding the unimportant players.
In this paper we consider only connected secret sharing
schemes, in other words, every player is important.
Closely related to this idea of important share is the no-
tion of dispensable components of a share [15]. Suppose a
2part of the share received by a player does not play a role
in the reconstruction of the secret in any of the minimal
authorized sets to which the player belongs, then that
part of the share can be discarded without any loss. We
call such parts of the share dispensable components and
indispensable otherwise. One way to create such compo-
nents is to distribute additional quantum states that are
unrelated to the secret. Such components neither aid nor
hinder a subset’s ability to reconstruct the secret. The
access structure realized by the scheme is unaffected if
such components of the share are discarded. We assume
that the secret sharing schemes considered in this paper
are devoid of such dispensable components in any share.
Definition 1 (CSS secret sharing schemes). A pure-state
secret sharing scheme Σ is said to be a CSS secret sharing
scheme if the encoding for the scheme is of the form
|s〉 7→ 1√|C|
∑
c∈C
|sX + c〉, (2)
where s ∈ Fq and X ∈ Fnq . A mixed-state secret scheme
is said to be CSS type if it can be obtained by discarding
one share of a pure-state CSS scheme.
As mixed-state schemes can be obtained from pure-
state schemes, see [9], without loss of generality we can
focus our attention on pure-state schemes. In terms of
access structures this implies we can focus on the self-
dual access structures.
Smith proposed a method to realize a quantum secret
sharing scheme for any quantum access structure using
monotone span programs. We will need parts of that
construction to prove our result and therefore provide a
quick review of the same. Further details can be found
in [10].
Definition 2 (Montone span program). A monotone
span program M is a triple (Fq,M, ψ) consisting of a
matrix M ∈ Fd×eq over Fq and surjective function ψ :
{1, 2, . . . , d} → P . The program is said to accept A ⊆ P
if and only if
ε1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0)
t ∈ im(M tA), (3)
where MA is the submatrix of M and consists of all the
rows that correspond to the participants in A.
We say M is the span matrix of the span program.
A monotone span program is said to compute an access
structure Γ if M accepts A ∈ Γ and rejects A 6∈ Γ. It
follows that for any unauthorized set B ⊆ P , we must
have ε1 6∈ Im(M tB). Alternatively, there exists some v =
(v1, . . . , ve) ∈ Feq such that MBv = 0 and v1 6= 0.
For every access structure Γ, we can realize it using
a monotone span program in a “normal form”. This is
not necessarily efficient but these realizations provide us
with the secret sharing states which are central for our
discussion. We caution the reader that our terminology
of span programs, especially the usage of normal form for
monotone span programs, does not follow the standard
terminology in the literature on span programs.
Definition 3 (Normal form monotone span program).
Suppose that Γmin = {A1, . . . Ak} and let |Ai| − 1 = ri.
Also let, r =
∑
i |Ai| and c = r − k =
∑
i ri. The
monotone span program that computes Γmin over Fq has
the span matrix M as given in equation (4). The map-
ping ψ is given as follows: The rows corresponding to
submatrix Iri corresponds to the first |Ai| − 1 partic-
ipants of the authorized set Ai. The row of the form
(1, 0, . . . , 0,−1, 0, . . . , 0) is labeled by the last participant
of Ai and −1 = (−1, . . . ,−1) ∈ Friq .
M =


Ir1
1 −1
Ir2
1 −1
...
. . .
Iri
1 −1
...
. . .
Irk
1 −1


(4)
Classically this matrix defines the encoding for the se-
cret sharing scheme. The scheme implicitly assumes an
ordering of the participants and the use of c random vari-
ables in addition to the secret. For each minimal autho-
rized set Ai, the scheme distributes si,1, si,2 . . . , si,ri and
s−∑j si,j , where si,j for 1 ≤ j ≤ ri are random variables.
More precisely, si,j is distributed to the jth player of Ai
for 1 ≤ j ≤ ri and s −
∑
j si,j to the last player in Ai.
Considering the distribution scheme for the entire set of
players we distribute uM t, where u = (s, s1, . . . , sc). In
the normal form construction, no player is unimportant
and no share has a dispensable component.
We make the following useful observations about the
structure of M as given in equation (4).
i) The rows associated to the players in any authorized
set are linearly independent.
ii) The rank of M is given by 1 + r1 + · · ·+ rk.
iii) The rows associated with any given participant are
linearly independent.
iv) For each column 2 ≤ j ≤ c+1 inM , there are exactly
two rows inM which have nonzero support on j and
they both belong to the same authorized set.
For a vector v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Fnq , we refer to the sup-
port of v as the set of coordinates for which vi 6= 0.
In the quantum secret sharing scheme due to Smith
[10] the encoded state is given by
|s〉 7→ 1√
qc
∑
u∈Fc+1q :u1=s
|uM t〉, (5)
where we assume that the u = (s, s1 . . . , sc) ∈ Fc+1q .
Please note that we do not need to use any additional
random variables in the quantum secret sharing schemes
3as opposed to the classical schemes. We also note that
the construction in [10] will hold for span matrices that
are not in normal form; however, the associated access
structure must still be self-dual. The reader might find
it helpful to refer to a small example given in the ap-
pendix.
We denote the von Neumann entropy of a quantum
state with the density matrix ρ by S(ρ) = −Tr(ρ log2 ρ).
The following relation on the entropies of the autho-
rized and unauthorized sets of a quantum secret sharing
scheme realized by monotone span programs was shown
in [14, Lemma 17].
Lemma 1 ([14]). Suppose M = (Fq,M, ψ) is a mono-
tone span program realizing a quantum access structure
Γ. Let A ∈ Γ and B = P \ A. Let rank(MA) = a,
rank(MB) = b and rank(M) = m and S(S) the entropy
of the secret S. Then we have
S(A) = (a+ b−m) log2 q + S(S) (6)
S(B) = (a+ b−m) log2 q (7)
III. ENTROPIC INEQUALITIES
In this section we prove our main result for monotonic-
ity of entropy for the unauthorized sets of a quantum se-
cret sharing scheme realized via the construction given
in the previous section. We need the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Suppose that M = (Fq,M, ψ) is a monotone
span program in normal form computing the access struc-
ture Γ. Let A ∪ B ∪ {p} = P be a partition of P where
B ∈ Γ. Let Ai ∈ Γmin be a minimal authorized set that
contains p. Denote by M{Ai} the submatrix of M with
|Ai| rows that correspond to the players in Ai. Then one
of the following holds:
i) If Ai ⊆ A¯, then any row in M{Ai} is linearly depen-
dent in MA¯ and linearly independent in MA′ , where
A′ = A ∪ {p}.
ii) If Ai 6⊆ A¯, then any row in M{Ai} is linearly inde-
pendent in MA¯ and linearly independent in MA′ .
Proof. Since Ai is authorized, ε1 is in im(M
t
Ai
) and there
exists some linear combination of the rows of MAi such
that
|Ai|∑
j=1
Rj = ε1,
where Rj are the rows ofMAi . Without loss of generality
let R1 be the row associated with p in M{Ai}. Since
A¯\{p} = B is still an authorized set, ε1 is also in im(M tB)
and there exists a linear combination of rows in B such
that
|MB |∑
j=1
βjQj = ε1 = R1 +
|Ai|∑
j=2
Rj ,
where Qj are the rows ofMB and |MB| denotes the num-
ber of rows of MB. Then clearly, R1 can be expressed as
a linear combination of the rows in MB.
Next, we show that R1 is independent inMA′ . Assume
that on the contrary that R1 can also be expressed as a
linear combination of the rows in MA′ (excluding R1).
Now observe that the rows corresponding to Ai are of
two types: either they have a single non-zero element
or they have 1 + |Ai| nonzero elements. Permuting if
necessary we can assume that R1 is of the form f =
(0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Fc+1q or g = (1,−1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Fc+1q .
A necessary condition for R1 be a linear combination
of rows of MA′ is that the support of these rows must
contain the support of R1. Keeping in mind that Ai \
{p} ⊆ B = A¯′, we infer that if R1 = f , then no row
in MA′ has overlap with the support of R1. If R1 =
g, then some rows of MA′ can have support in the first
coordinate but not in the next |Ai|−1 coordinates, where
R1 is nonzero. Therefore it must be the case that R1 is
independent in MA′ . This proves the first part of the
lemma.
Now let us consider the case when Ai 6⊆ A¯. If R1 = g,
then whether it is in MA¯ or MA′ , the rows in A¯ do not
contain the support of R1 and similarly the rows in MA′
do not contain the support of R1. Hence it is independent
in both MA¯ and MA′ . If R1 = f , then g corresponds to
some other participant p′ who is in either A¯ or A′ but not
both as A′∩A¯ = {p}. Thus g is in one of the rows ofMA′
orMA¯ but not both. Consequently, R1 is independent in
one of MA′ or MA¯.
Suppose that both R1 and g are in the same set S,
where S is either A′ or A¯. Note that Ai 6⊆ A¯ and neither
is Ai 6⊆ A′ because A′ 6∈ Γ. It follows that M{Ai} must
contain other rows and the support of g extends beyond
the support of R1 and the first coordinate. Then since
g is the only element whose support overlaps with R1,
any linear combination of rows that generates R1 must
include g. We could rewrite this linear combination to
express g as a linear combination of the elements of S.
But we have already seen that g is linearly independent
in both the sets A′ and A¯. Therefore, it follows that such
a combination does not exist and R1 is independent as
well. This proves the second part of the lemma.
With this preparation we are now ready to prove our
central result.
Theorem 1. Suppose that an access structure Γ is real-
ized using the normal form monotone span construction.
Let A ⊆ B ⊆ P .Then
S(A) ≤ S(B) if A,B 6∈ Γ
S(A) ≥ S(B) if A,B ∈ Γ (8)
Proof. Let us first show this result assuming that Γ is a
self-dual access structure. The proof relies on Lemma 1.
Without loss of generality we can assume that |B\A| = 1
4in other words, B \A = {p}. Let
Ap = {Ai ∈ Γmin : Ai ⊆ A¯ and p ∈ Ai}
A¯p = {Ai ∈ Γmin : Ai 6⊆ A¯ and p ∈ Ai}
Suppose that Ap 6= ∅. Then there exists some Ai ∈
Γmin such that p ∈ Ai ⊆ A¯. Consider the rows asso-
ciated to this set in M , i.e. MAi. By Lemma 2, this
row is dependent in MA¯ and therefore removing it will
not change the rank of the resulting submatrix. On the
otherhand, by the same lemma we know that this row is
independent in MA′ , where A
′ = A ∪ {p}, therefore the
rank of the matrix obtained by adding this row to MA is
greater by one.
Repeating this process for all the Ai in Ap, we obtain
a matrix with fewer rows than MA¯ but having the same
rank. On the other hand, the rank of the matrix obtained
by adding these rows to MA increases for each element
in Ap.
Now consider an authorized set Ai ∈ A¯p. Since Ai is
not a subset of A¯, it follows that some participant of Ai
must be in A. By Lemma 2, the row associated with p in
M{Ai} is independent in MA¯ as well as MA′ . Therefore,
the rank of the submatrix obtained by removing this row
fromMA¯ diminishes by one while the submatrix obtained
by adding this row to MA increases by one. Once again
repeating this process for all the Ai ∈ A¯p we see the
the rank of MA′ increases by |A¯p|, while the rank of the
submatrix obtained by removing all the rows associated
with p in A¯p reduces its rank by |A¯p|.
Therefore adjoining to MA all the rows associated
with p gives us MB¯ and while, removing them from
MA¯ gives MB. From the preceding discussion we see
that rank(MB¯) = rank(MA¯) − |A¯p| and rank(MB) =
rank(MA) + |Ap| + |A¯p|. By Lemma 1, the entropy of
B is given by
S(B)
log2 q
= rank(MB) + rank(MB¯)− rank(M)
= rank(MA) + |Ap|+ |A¯p|+ rank(MA¯)− |A¯p|
− rank(M)
= rank(MA) + rank(MA¯)− rank(M) + |Ap|
=
S(A)
log2 q
+ |Ap| ≥ S(A)
log2 q
If |B \A| > 1, we can inductively apply this argument to
every consecutive pair of sets in the following chain
A = Bk ⊂ Bk−1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ B1 ⊂ B0 = B,
where |Bi+1 \Bi| = 1. Applying to each adjacent pair in
the above chain gives us
S(A) ≤ S(Bk−1) ≤ · · · ≤ S(B1) ≤ S(B).
This proves the theorem for the case when the access
structure is self-dual and A,B 6∈ Γ.
If A ⊆ B ∈ Γ, then we note that both B¯ ⊆ A¯ 6∈ Γ and
we must have S(B¯) ≤ S(A¯). But we also know that for
a self-dual access structure S(A¯) = S(A) − S(S) if A is
authorized [13, 14]. Therefore, S(B)−S(S) ≤ S(A)−S(S)
and this proves the theorem when Γ is self-dual.
Now suppose that Γ is not a self-dual access structure,
then we can purify it to get a self-dual access structure Γ
for which equation (8) holds. Recall that the authorized
(unauthorized) sets of Γ are also authorized (unautho-
rized) sets of Γ and the associated shares are obtained
by tracing out the additional participant used for purifi-
cation, see [9] for details about purification. Therefore,
the result holds for any quantum access structure imple-
mented via the normal form monotone span construc-
tion.
Corollary 2. For an access structure realized via the
normal form monotone span construction, the follow-
ing relations hold: Among the authorized sets the min-
imal authorized sets of an access structure have maximal
entropy and among the unauthorized sets the maximal
unauthorized sets have maximal entropy.
Please note the the above corollary does not imply
that all minimal (maximal) authorized (unauthorized)
sets have the same entropy. Further, along with Lemma 1
it implies that if we consider a minimal authorized set,
the entropy of the sets obtained by either adding partici-
pants or removing participants from the minimal autho-
rized set will be lower.
IV. DISCUSSION
An obvious question is if these results can be extended
to all quantum secret sharing states arising via mono-
tone span programs and more generally, to all secret
sharing states. While this result might be extended to
other classes of secret sharing states, it does not seem
to generalize for arbitrary quantum secret sharing states.
Nonetheless, these results could be prove to be useful and
provide additional interesting insights into quantum se-
cret sharing states in that by partly recovering the mono-
tonicity for the von Neumann entropy we may be able to
prove new constrained inequalities for the von Neumann
entropy.
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Appendix A: An Example
We provide a small example to illustrate the details of
the construction of quantum secret sharing schemes from
monotone span programs. Consider the minimal access
5structure Γmin = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 1}}. The span matrix
M for this access structure is given by
M =


0 1 0 0
1 −1 0 0
0 0 1 0
1 0 −1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 −1


.
The function ψ : {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} → P , takes the values
ψ(1) = 1, ψ(2) = 2, ψ(3) = 1, ψ(4) = 3, ψ(5) = 3
and ψ(6) = 1. Following equation (5), we find that the
encoding (up to normalization) for the quantum secret
sharing scheme is given by
|0〉 7→ |000000〉+ |110000〉+ |001100〉+ |000011〉
+|111100〉+ |110011〉+ |001111〉+ |111111〉
|1〉 7→ |101010〉+ |011010〉+ |100110〉+ |101001〉
+|011110〉+ |011001〉+ |100101〉+ |010101〉
Then by Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 we compute the en-
tropy for the unauthorized sets {{∅}, {1}} is 0, log2 q re-
spetively, while for the authorized sets {{1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}}
it is S(S) + log2 q and S(S), where S(S) is the entropy of
the secret.
In general, for self-dual access structures, if we start
with the empty set and keep adding participants the en-
tropy first increases until it becomes a minimal autho-
rized set and then starts decreasing until it reaches S(S),
giving a “tent-like” characteristic. More precisely con-
sider the following chain of sets ∅ = B0 ( B1 ( · · · (
Bn−1 ( Bn = P , such that |Bi \ Bi−1| = 1. Then
only one of these sets is a minimal authorized set, say
Bj . If we now plot the entropy of these subsets we typ-
ically get a plot similar to the figure shown below, with
S(B0) = 0 and S(Bn) = S(S) and the entropy peaking
at the minimal authorized set Bj . (Please note that the
figure below is only representative and does not corre-
spond to any quantum access structure. For simplicity,
we assume that the secret is a completely mixed state;
thus S(S) = log2 q.)
S(Bi)/ S(S)
B0 B1 Bj Bn
The mixed-state schemes, i.e. those realizing non-self-
dual access structures, also show a similar but not exactly
the same “tent-like” behavior in that S(Bn) ≥ S(S).
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